

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR EG IS XF
SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID TALKS: SADAT'S COMPULSIONS
- AND CONSTRAINTS

THIS IS THE SECOND IN A SERIES OF THREE MESSAGES ON
EGYPTIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AS THEY AFFECT
THE PEACE PROCESS. IT ADDRESSES ITSELF TO SADAT'S COM-
PULSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS AS HE APPROACHES THE CAMP DAVID
TALKS.

A. COMPULSIONS:

1. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS SADAT'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO
LEAD EGYPT TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. HE CHERISHES
THE IMAGE OF WORLD STATESMAN AND FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT
HIS NOVEMBER, 1977 VISIT TO JERUSALEM HAS IRREVOCABLY
ALTERED THE PEACE EQUATION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THAT
TIME. SADAT TODAY IS A MAN OF PEACE, STRIVING TO ACHIEVE
IT. MRS. SADAT, WHO HAS EQUALLY STRONG VIEWS ON THE
SUBJECT, REINFORCES THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT.

2. SECOND, SADAT RECOGNIZES THAT EGYPT NEEDS PEACE IF
IT IS TO GRAPPLE WITH ITS HORRENDOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
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PROBLEMS. NOT ENTIRELY CORRECTLY, HE ATTRIBUTES THE
NATION'S DECREPIT INFRASTRUCTURE TO THE ALMOST TOTAL
ALLOCATION OF ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES DURING THE NASSER
ERA TO THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT. A REARRANGEMENT OF
RESOURCE ALLOCATION IS NEEDED IF THE COUNTRY IS TO PULL
ITSELF UP BY THE BOOT STRAPS, AND SADAT IS AWARE THAT
THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACE. EGYPTIAN

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES APPROACH TWO BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR, EXCLUSIVE OF PAYMENTS MADE BY SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF COUNTRIES FOR ARMS. SADAT SPEAKS OF SHIFTING AT LEAST ONE-THIRD OF THAT TO URGENTLY NEEDED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ONCE PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED.

3. A WORD OF CAUTION NEEDS BE INSERTED HERE, HOWEVER. CONTRARY TO SOME VIEWS, EGYPT'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE IMPERATIVE FORCING SADAT TO MAKE PEACE. WHILE AWARE OF ECONOMICS AS A FACT BEARING ON EGYPTIAN POLITICAL LIFE, CERTAINLY AS EXEMPLIFIED IN EVENTS SUCH AS THE JANUARY RIOTS, HE IS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THE FIELD, IS OFTEN POORLY ADVISED ON THE SUBJECT AND DOES NOT FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONS BEYOND CONCEPTUAL GENERALITIES. A REAL PEACE CANNOT HELP BUT BRING CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO EGYPT, BUT ONE MUST LOOK TO POLITICAL FACTORS AND PERSONAL LEADERSHIP QUALITIES FOR CONVINCING REASONS BEHIND SADAT'S DECISION TO PRESS FOR AN ARAB-ISRAELI ACCOMMODATION. HE SHOWED IN OCTOBER, 1973 THAT EGYPT CAN CONDUCT A LIMITED MILITARY OPERATION DESPITE THE COUNTRY'S VIRTUAL BANKRUPTCY. IF NECESSARY, HE CAN DO SO AGAIN.

4. THIRD, SADAT IS KEENLY AWARE THAT EGYPT CANNOT WIN ANOTHER WAR WITH ISRAEL. WHILE THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES HAVE AT BEST ACHIEVED SOMETHING LIKE THEIR PRE-
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OCTOBER, 1973 CAPABILITY, HE, GAMASY AND THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP KNOW THAT MASSIVE U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS HAVE GREATLY INCREASED ISRAEL'S MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY STRENGTH IS OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL. CUT OFF FROM SOVIET RESUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS, EGYPT HAS NOT TO DATE FOUND A SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE SOURCE. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IS PROFESSIONAL. IT IS PREPARED TO DO ITS DUTY IF CALLED UPON, BUT IS NOT PRESSING THE PRESIDENT TO RESUME THE WAR OPTION AGAINST ISRAEL. THE MYTH OF AN EGYPTIAN MILITARY VICTORY IN OCTOBER, 1973 REMAINS A STRONG, SUSTAINING ELEMENT IN THE MILITARY'S PSYCHE AND IS CAREFULLY FOSTERED. AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH SADAT AND GAMASY ARE PAINFULLY AWARE OF THE HEAVY LOSSES AND CASUALTIES INCURRED IN THE OCTOBER, 1973 WAR AND ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO REPEAT THESE. HENCE, THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAS SUPPORTED SADAT'S PEACE EFFORT AND IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO AS LONG AS IT OFFERS ANY PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS.

5. STILL A FOURTH COMPULSION, ADMITTEDLY OF A MORE LIMITED NATURE, IS SADAT'S CONCERN WITH SOVIET DESIGNS IN AFRICA AND THE THREAT THAT HE PERCEIVES THESE AC-

TIVITIES POSE FOR EGYPT. HE HAS AT TIMES INDICATED THAT HE CONSIDERES THE SOVIET THREAT IN AFRICA TO BE MORE PRESSING THAN EVEN THE ISRAELI THREAT. HE VIEWS QADHAFI AND MENGISTU AS SOVIET SURROGATES INTENT UPON UNSEATING SUDANESE PRESIDENT NUMAYRI AND REPLACING HIM WITH A COMMUNIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT. THIS, IN HIS VIEW, WOULD POSE A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO EGYPT, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MET WITH ARMED FORCE. THE SUDAN

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HAS BECOME A PART OF THE SECURITY PERIMETER OF EGYPT. NOT ALL OF HIS COLLEAGUES ATTACH AS MUCH WEIGHT TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AS SADAT DOES, BUT FOR HIM THE THREAT IS REAL AND IMMEDIATE.

B. CONSTRAINTS:

6. IN THE POLITICAL AND AREA FRAMEWORK IN WHICH HE WORKS, SADAT HAS BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS IN NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WITH RESPECT TO THE WEST BANK WHERE EGYPT IS DEVOID OF ANY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE REGIONAL ARAB SUB-SYSTEM OF WHICH EGYPT IS A PART, SUCH A DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, REFLECTING A CONSENSUS OF THE OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND THE PALESTINIANS.

7. IN THE EXTERNAL FIELD, SADAT'S PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINT ARISES FROM THIS LACK OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE WEST BANK MATTERS. (EGYPT'S RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE

SINAI IS UNQUESTIONED AND ITS RESIDUAL STANDING IN GAZA
ALSO GIVES SADAT SUFFICIENT RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE ISSUES
PERTAINING TO THESE TWO AREAS.) IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
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ARAB LEAGUE MANDATE, SADAT WILL AT ALL TIMES HAVE TO
WEIGH THE WIDER ACCEPTABILITY OR OTHERWISE TO THE ARABS
OF ANY ARRANGEMENTS THAT HE MAY BE DISPOSED TO AGREE
UPON. SPECIFICALLY, WHATEVER WEST BANK ARRANGEMENTS HE
NEGOTIATES MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO KING HUSSEIN AND TO THE
MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS, BOTH IN THE WEST BANK AND THOSE
LIVING ABROAD. UNLESS SADAT CAN OBTAIN THE ACQUIESCENCE
OF THESE TWO DIRECTLY INVOLVED ARAB ELEMENTS, THERE IS
LITTLE CHANCE OF PERSUADING SAUDI ARABIA, THE ARAB STATE
WHICH MEANS MOST TO HIM, TO ACCEPT THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

8. SADAT MUST ALWAYS BEAR IN MIND THAT SAUDI DISAPPROVAL
WOULD (A) DIMINISH STILL MORE EGYPT'S ALREADY SHAKEN
CLAIM TO A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD
AND (B) MORE PRACTICALLY, IT COULD RESULT IN A CUTOFF
OR SHARP REDUCTION IN BADLY NEEDED SAUDI AND GULF
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT. SIMILARLY,
HE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT OUTRAGING THE MODERATE ARAB
STATES BY ARRANGEMENTS PERCEIVED AS SURRENDERING TO
ISRAELI TERRITORIAL DEMANDS COULD CAUSE ARAB STATES
WHERE EGYPTIANS ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED TO EXPEL SOME OR
ALL OF THEM. OVER ONE MILLION EGYPTIAN LABORERS, SKILLED
AND UNSKILLED, ARE NOW WORKING ABROAD, MAINLY IN SAUDI
ARABIA AND WEALTHIER ARAB STATES. SHOULD ANY SIZEABLE
NUMBER OF EGYPTIANS BE EXPELLED FROM THESE STATES IN
RETALIATION FOR WHATEVER WEST BANK ARRANGEMENTS ARE
NEGOTIATED BY SADAT, IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF SHARPLY
REDUCING HARD CURRENCY REMITTANCES. THESE HAVE BECOME
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE EGYPTIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
AND HAVE CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO EGYPT'S IMPROVED
POSITION IN THIS REGARD. IT WOULD ALSO DUMP THESE
EXPELLED EGYPTIAN WORKERS ON AN ALREADY SATURATED
EGYPTIAN LABOR MARKET. NO ONE CAN BE SURE OF THE EXTENT
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TO WHICH THIS MIGHT HAPPEN, BUT THE PERCEIVED THREAT
THAT IT MIGHT IS AN INHIBITING ELEMENT TO EGYPTIAN
VENTURESOMENESS IN APPROACHING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, SADAT'S PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINT
IS THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HE NEGOTIATES MUST BE

ACCEPTABLE TO THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, NOTWITHSTANDING EFFORTS AT DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE CIVILIAN SECTOR, ANY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUST, IF HE IS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE, HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY. GAMASY, DESPITE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SOME OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES ON EGYPT'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY, HAS THUS FAR SUPPORTED HIM. WE HAVE NONE-THELESS BEEN HEARING OF INCREASING RESTIVENESS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES ABOUT THE PACE AND DIRECTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAS NO PARTICULAR LOVE FOR THE PALESTINIANS, BUT IT--LIKE THE CIVILIAN SECTOR--HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THIRTY YEARS OF CONDITIONING THAT "PALESTINIAN RIGHTS", WHATEVER THAT MAY MEAN, ARE A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ANY PEACE EXERCISE. SHOULD PALESTINIAN INTERESTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN JETTISONED BY SADAT, SADAT WOULD HAVE TO RECKON WITH EGYPTIAN MILITARY AS WELL AS CIVILIAN DISAPPROVAL. HOW FAR SUCH DISAPPROVAL WOULD GO WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY UPON THE EXTENT TO WHICH "PALESTINIAN RIGHTS" ARE PERCEIVED BY THE MILITARY TO HAVE BEEN SACRIFICED TO THE ISRAELIS.

10. TO A LESSER EXTENT, SADAT MUST BEAR IN MIND THE ACCEPTABILITY OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS HE NEGOTIATES TO THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC. MIDDLE CLASS EGYPTIAN ELEMENTS AND BUSINESSMEN ARE PROFOUNDLY TIRED OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND WOULD DEARLY LIKE TO SEE IT RESOLVED WITH

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HONOR. THE ARAB CONCEPT OF HONOR NEEDS TO BE RETAINED, HOWEVER, AND IF SADAT IS PERCEIVED TO HAVE VIOLATED THAT, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS WILL BE SHARPLY REDUCED.

-- IN WEIGHING PUBLIC REACTION, SADAT MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THE ORTHODOX RELIGIOUS RIGHT, I.E., THE OLD MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL AND WANTS A RECOVERY OF ARAB/ ISLAMIC JERUSALEM. APART FROM NUMEROUS MILITANT ISLAMIC OFFSHOOTS, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD HAS IN RECENT YEARS BEEN SOMEWHAT INCHOATE DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF STRONG, RECOGNIZED LEADERS. BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE BROTHERHOOD IS ATTEMPTING TO REORGANIZE ITSELF INTO A MORE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL FORCE. SHOULD IT SUCCEED, IT COULD BE THE LARGEST POLITICAL GROUPING AND ONE WHICH HAS A PAST HISTORY OF URBAN TERRORISM. SADAT IS WELL AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ORTHODOX MUSLIM RIGHT IN EGYPTIAN SOCIETY AND HAS USED HASSAN TUHAMI, AMONG OTHERS, AS A CHANNEL TO THAT ELEMENT. TUHAMI'S SUCCESS MAS TO DATE BEEN LIMITED AND THE BROTHERHOOD IS KNOWN TO BE DECIDEDLY UNHAPPY ABOUT SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE.

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-- THE LEFT MAY ALSO BE EXPECTED TO LOOK FOR MEANS OF SEIZING UPON THE RESULTS OF SADAT'S EFFORTS TO EMBARRASS HIM. SHOULD HUSSEIN, THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SAUDIS DISAPPROVE OF THE RESULTS OF SADAT'S NEGOTIATIONS, THIS WILL OFFER THE LEFT A CONVENIENT HANDLE TO TRY TO BRING OUT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST SADAT FOR BETRAYAL OF THE ARAB CAUSE. THE LEFT IS ANXIOUS TO UNSEAT SADAT, BUT KNOWS IT CANNOT DO SO EXCEPT THROUGH (A) THE TACIT ACQUIESCENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY BECAUSE OF DISAPPROVAL OF SADAT'S POLICIES, AND (B) MASSIVE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE IN JANUARY, 1977. THE LEFT HOPES THAT SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS WILL PROVE TO BE UNCONTROLLABLE, ESPECIALLY IF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IS SUFFICIENTLY DISTURBED ABOUT THE RESULTS OF SADAT'S NEGOTIATIONS THAT IT DECLINES TO INTERVENE IN THE FACE OF MILITANT PUBLIC REACTION. IN ANY SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS THE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, MANY OF WHOM ARE LEFTISTS OR RELIGIOUS RIGHTISTS, MAY BE EXPECTED TO BE LINCHPINS. THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT, THEREFORE, IS THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY. THIS IN TURN DEPENDS UPON ITS PERCEPTION THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS NEGOTIATED BY SADAT ARE HONORABLE RATHER THAN A SURRENDER TO ISRAELI DEMANDS.

11. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL IN-HOUSE CONSTRAINT. WITHIN THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION, BOTH FONMIN MOHAMED IBRAHIM KAMEL AND MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI MAY BE EXPECTED TO URGE THE PRESIDENT NOT TO MAKE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN THE

WEST BANK THAT GO BEYOND A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF
"MINOR". THEIR CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE ARE TWO-FOLD:
FIRST, SADAT MAY BE PERSUADED BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO
COMMIT HIMSELF ON WEST BANK TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS,
WHICH MAY BE REPUDIATED BY KING HUSSEIN, THE PALESTINIANS
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AND EVEN THE SAUDIS. SECOND, FINDING THAT IN A BURST
OF ENTHUSIASM HE HAS OVERCOMMITTED HIMSELF AT CAMP DAVID,
SADAT MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY SEEK ASSUAGE ARAB WRATH BY
BACK-PEDDLING. THIS, THEY POINT OUT, CAN ONLY LEAD TO
DAMAGING US/EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AND TO IMPUGNING SADAT'S
GLOBAL CREDIBILITY. HASSAN TUHAMI REMAINS A SHADOWY,
ELUSIVE FIGURE WHOSE VIEWS ON WEST BANK MATTERS WE HAVE
NEVER HEARD EXPRESSED. HASSAN KAMEL IS PRIMARILY A
PROTOCOL FIGURE. HE WILL NOT HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON
EGYPTIAN DECISIONS. IN SUCH IN-HOUSE DELIBERATIONS,
SADAT WILL BE THE DECIDING FIGURE AND WILL, AS NECESSARY,
MAKE THE HARD DECISIONS. HE DOES HAVE A FATHERLY CON-
CERN FOR MOHAMED KAMEL, HOWEVER, AND MAY BE EXPECTED TO
PAY AT LEAST SOME HEED TO THE LATTER'S COUNSEL. EILTS

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